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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
E. PAUL THOMPSON,

Plaintiff-Re8pondent,
Case No.

vs.
THE CITY OF CENTERVILLE,
a Municipal Corporation,

10562

Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action by the respondent, a taxpayer,
against the City of Centerville, pursuant to the Declaratory Judgments Act (Rule 57, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, and Chapter 33, Title 78, Utah Code Annotated, 1953).
Herein the plaintiff asked the court to restrain
the appellant from conducting a bond election in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Utah Municipal
1

BondAct, i.e., Chapter 41, Laws of Utah, 1965 (Chapter
14 of Title 11, Utah Code Annotated, 1953). The plaintiff asked the court to rule on the constitutionality of
certain provisions of the Utah :Municipal Bond Act, towit: Section 11-14-5 and 11-14-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (Sections 6 and 7 of Chapter 41, Laws of Utah,
1965) as it related to the procedure to be followed by
the municipality in conducting a bond election.

DISPOSITION IN LOvVER COURT
The relief prayed for in plaintiff's complaint wa5
granted by restraining the holding of the bond election
and finding that a portion of the statute was uncon·
stitutional:
The portion of section 11-14-5, Utah Codi
Annotated, 1953 (section 6, Utah Municipal
Bond Act, chapter 41, Laws of Utah, 19651
which extends the definition of a "taxpayer" to
include the spouse of one paying taxes is un·
constitutional and beyond the power of the legis·
lature.
The district court upheld the constitutionality oi
the remaining portions of Sections 11-14-5 and 11-1 H,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
Defendants appealed.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellants seek reversal of the judgment
straining the holding of the bond election.
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STATElVIENT OF FACTS
The city council of the City of Centerville, the
appellants, adopted a resolution providing for the holding of a special election in Centerville City for the purpose of submitting to the qualified taxpaying electors
thereof the question of the issuance of general obligation
bonds. The resolution followed the provisions of the
Utah lVlunicipal Bond Act, supra. The resolution provided that a special election be held submitting the
matter of the authorization of the general obligation
bonds to such qualified electors of the city as shall have
paid a property tax in the year preceding the election.
(Record p. 6.)
The resolution, m pursuance of Section 11-14-5,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provided that:
" ... all qualified electors of the city who shall
have paid a property tax therein in the year preceding such election shall be entitled to vote at
such election."
and specified that the following instructions be used in
determining voters' qualifications:
" (a) A qualified elector shall be deemed to have
paid the required property tax in the city if he
owns any property therein, title to which is held
in his name, and he has pt\id any tax thereon during the twelve months preceding the election.
" ( b) The spouse of any person mentioned in
sub-paragraph (a) shall be deemed to have paid
such property tax.

3

" (c) A qualified elector shall be deemed to
have paid the required property tax in the city
if he has contracted to purchase any real property therein and pursuant to the terms of such
contract shall have supplied money which has
been applied to the payment of taxes on such
property during the twelve months preceding
the election.
" (d) A person whose name appears on the official tax rolls of the county as having paid a tax
on property in the city during the twelve-month
period immediately preceding the election, shall
prima facie be considered to have paid the property tax required to qualify him to vote in the
election." (Record p. 9.)
The resolution, pursuant to the provisions of Section 11-14-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, then specified:
the manner in which the qualifications of each qualified,
elector offering to vote as a taxpayer within the above·,
stated definitions would be established by providing:
" ... his status as a taxpayer shall be challenged
by one of the election officials (or may be chal·
lenged by any other persgn) at the time the bal·
lot is applied for and he shall be given a ballot
and be permitted to vote if he is shown on the
registration lists as a registered voter in the city
and if he signs an oath sworn to before one of
the election officials that he is a qualified elector
of such city and has paid a property tax therein
in the 12 months preceding the election." (Rec·
ord p. 9).
The plaintiff, by his complaint, brought this action
to prevent the conducting of the election asserting that

4
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these provisions of the Utah lHunicipal Bond Act were
violative of Article XI Y, Section 3 of the Constitution
of the State of Utah in that the legislature, by enacting
the statutory sections relating to the qualifications of
voters reduced the standards fixed by the Constitution
and thereby extended the privilege of voting to persons
not constitutionally authorized so to do.
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THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION.
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NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY AUTHORIZED SO TO DO.

By means of its resolution, the City of Centerville
sought to authorize and conduct an election for the
purpose of authorizing the issuance of general obligation
bonds of the city for the purpose of constructing a
reservoir and extensions to the culinary water system.
(Record p. 6).
It followed the procedures established by the Utah
Municipal Bond Act, supra, which was enacted by the
1965 session of the Utah legislature. This act, among
other things, seeks to implement and interpret the pro-
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visions of Section 3 of Article XIV of the Constitution
of the State of Utah which reads as follows:
"No debt in excess of the taxes for the current
year shall be created by any county or subdivi·
sion thereof, or by any school district therein,
or by any city, town or village, or any subdivision. tl:Jereof in this State; unless the proposition to create such debt, shall have been submitted
to a vote of such qualified electors as shall have
paid a property tax therein, in the year preceding
such election, and a majority of those voting
thereon shall have voted in favor of incurring
such debt." (Emphasis supplied).
The italicized portion of the above-quoted Section
3 is the part of the section with which we are concerned
in this proceeding.
The legislature, in Section 6 of the Utah Municipal'
Bond Act, describes for the guidance of the election
officials who should be deemed to be "such qualified'
electors as shall have paid a property tax therein." ,
Section 6 of the Utah Municipal Bond Act read~
as follows:
"The words (qualified electors of the muni~i·
pality as shall have paid a property tax therern
in the year preceding such election, as used
herein shall have the same meaning as do the
same words appearing in Section 3 of Article
XIV of the Utah Constitution. Subject to any
contrary interpretation thereof which may here·
after be made by final decision of a court of corn·
petent jurisdiction, election officials conducting
b<l_nd elections and county officials whose dut:

6

it may be to supply records to such election offieials for use in determining voters' qualifications
shall interpret the aforesaid words in the light
of the following instructions:
" (a) A qualified elector shall be deemed to have
paid the required property tax in the municipality or other entity so proposing to issue the
bonds if he owns any property therein, title to
which is held in his name, and he has paid any
tax thereon during the twelve months preceding
the election.
" ( b) The spouse of any person mentioned in
subparagraph (a) shall be deemed to have paid
a property tax.
" ( c) A qualified elector shall be deemed to have
paid the required property tax in the municipality or other entity so proposing to issue the
bonds if he has contracted to purchase any real
property therein and pursuant to the terms of
such contract shall have supplied money which
has been applied to the payment of taxes on
such property during the twelve months preceding the election.
"A person whose name appears on the official
tax rolls of the cpunty or counties in which the
municipality or entity is located as having paid
a tax on property in the municipality or entity
during the twelve-months period immediately
preceding the bond election shall prima facie be
considered to have paid the property tax required to qualify him to vote in the election."
The legislature described in a portion ofSection
6 of the Utah :Municipal Bond Act the manner in
which the election officials could determine whether

7

or not any proposed voter constituted a "qualified
elector of the municipality as shall have paid a property tax therein in the year preceding such election"
by adopting the following language, comprising a part
of Section 11-14-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953:
"Prior to a bond election, the registration lists
to be used may be checked against the tax rolls
of such county or counties and the names of the
electors shown on the registration lists who ap-'
pear after sych checking to have so paid such
property tax may be indicated in some convenient manner on the registration lists and such
indication shall also be prima f acie evidence of
the status of the elector as a property taxpayer,:
but the failure so to mark the registration lists i
shall not be considered an irregularity or ground '
for invalidating the bond election. A person
applying for a ballot at any bond election whose I
qualifications to vote are challenged by any one~
or more of the election officials or by any other
person at the time the ballot is applied for shall
receive a ballot and be permitted to vote if (I)
such person is shown on the registration lists
as a registered voter in the municipality or
other entity calling the bond election, and (2)
such person signs an oath sworn to before one
of the election officials that he is a qualified
elector of such municipality or entity and has
paid a property tax tperein in the year preceding
the bond election."
The constitutional question before the court is
whether or not the sections of the Utah Municipal
Bond Act relating to qualifications of voters is an attempt upon the part of the legislature to reduce the

8

standards fixed by the Constitution for the exercise
of the elective franchise and by this means to extend
the privilege of voting to persons not otherwise constitutionally authorized to do so. (Roberts v. Spray,
223 P.2d, 808, 819 (Ariz. 1950), and Bethune v. Salt
River Valley Water Users' Assn., 227 P. 989, 992
(Ariz. 1924).
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The general rule of law widely recognized, is that
a state legislature, under its conceded power to regulate
and administer the election process, may neither prevent
those constitutionally qualified from voting nor permit
those not constitutionally qualified to vote:
See: 18 American Jurisprudence, Elections
§ 51 p. 213 and the cases cited there, especially:

People v. English,
29 N. E. 678, 680, (Ill. 1892)
S cown v. Czarnecki,
106 N. E. 276, 283 (Ill. 1914)
Tolbert v. Long,
67 S. E. 826, 828 (Ga. 1910)

It is also the generally accepted rule that constitutions
are to b~ liberally construed in order that they
d
might meet and be a pp lied to new conditions and cir,S
g cumstances as they arise in the course of progress of the
community. (16 Am. Jur. 2d, page 234, § 61 and §62.)
e

.S

ii

At § 61, 16 Am. Jur. 2d, page 234, has this
to say:
"A constitution usually announces certain basic
principles to serve as the perpetual foundation
9

of the state. It is not intended to be a limitation
on the State's healthful development nor a11
obstruction to its progress. Accordingly, the
courts are not inclined to adopt such a technical
or strained construction is will unduly impair the
efficiency of the legislature to meet responsi·
bilities occasioned by changing conditions of
society. It is proper to as~ume that a constitution
is intended to meet and be applied to new con·
ditions and circumstances as they may arise in
the course of the progress of the community.'
The courts in this country have shown a deter·
mina tion to give our written constitutions, by.
interpretation, such flexibility as will bring them
into accord with what the courts believe to be
public interest.
"There is a definite obligation of law to progres1
which should not be ignored in the interpreta·
tion of constitutions. Their terms and provisiom •
are being constantly expanded and enlarged by•
construction to meet the advancing and improv·
ing affairs of men. The United States Supreme
Court has said that the scope of the 'vague, un· !
definable, admonitory provisions of the Constitu·
tion' is inevitably addressed to changing circumstances.
( Y akus v. United States, 321 US 414, 88 Law·
yers' Edition 834; Ullman v. United States,
350 US 422, 100 Lawyers' Edition 511; Parkin·
son v. Watson, 4 Utah 2d 191, 291 P 2d 400)."
This rule of construction takes into consideration
the facts that constitutions are broader in their scope
than statutes. They are original and unlimited and arr
in effect for a longer period of time. Their amendment
is usually cumbersome.
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Accordingly, the objectives of constitutional provisions rather than the form of expression must be
regarded.
16 American Jurisprudence 2d 239, §63 states:

"The practical construction of a constitution
is to be followed, in order that effect may be
given the purpose of its provisions. The established practical construction of a constitutional
provision should not be disregarded unless the
terms of the provision f urinsh clear and definite
support for a contrary construction ...
"A constitution, viewed as a continuously operative charter of government, is not to be interpreted as demanding the impossible or the impracticable.
(Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 US 81,

87 Lawyers' Edition 1774)."

Appellant submits that the legislature merely
sought, by the enactment of the Utah lVIunicipal Bond
Act and in particular of the sections in question, to
assist the political subdivisions and their election officials
to implement the constitutional provision and that the
enactment of Sections 11-14-5 and 11-14-6, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, did not expand the constitutionallyqualified electors.
Point 2
THE LEGISLATURE HAS THE PO"TER
AND RESPONSIBILITY TO HELP ELEC11

TION OFFICIALS I.MPLEl\IENT THE CONSTITUTION AL PROVISION.
Sections 11-14-5 and 11-14-G, Ctah Code Annotated, 1953, merely provide a method or procedure for
ascertaining whether a person who presents himself
to vote is qualified to vote.
It is generally recognized that the legislature has
the power and responsibility to help election officials
implement constitutional provisions as to voter qualifications.

i
1

I

I

The l\laryland courts refer to this as the power .
to enact rules of evidence:
I
"The constitution itself merely designates the
qualifications, and then leaves the legislature free
to declare by what evidence those qualifications
must be shown to exist. It is perfectly competent
for the legislature to say what shall and what
shall not be admissible evidence to pron a particular fact; ... " (Southerland v. Norr~, 22
A. 137,l\ld. 1891).
"There the legislature has exercised this power and
spoken the effect giYen that legislation by the courts is
not always uniform. .Although numberless cases could
be cited to demonstrate that registration provisions are
directory or mandatory or even unconstitutional, as
attempting to impose additional qualifications to those
prm·ided by the constitution for voting, the following
cases graphically illustrate the courts' attitudes:
In Henderson

t'.

Gladish. 128 S.,V. 2d 257 (Ark

12

1

·
:
·
'

1939) the Arkansas general assembly had provided that

poll tax receipts, which had to be presented to election
officials before an elector could be allowed to vote, had
to be written with pen and ink. The court held that the
yotes were not rendered illegal because the poll tax
receipts had been written through carbon paper. In so
holding the court stated that:
'i

" ... the lawmaking body did not have power to
prohibit election officers from receiving other evidence that the tax had been paid .... The officers possess a discretion in receiving or rejecting
evidence other than pen-and-ink-written receipts,
and if they should reject insubstantial evidence,
that discretion would not be abused."

iI
I
I
I

'!

'

'

Ii

Wendover v. Tobin, 261 S.vV. 434 (Tex. 1924) is
to the same effect where the court construed a city
charter as merely providing
" ... for the officers of the election a method or
methods by which it can be ascertained whether
the voter has paid taxes on property in the city .
. . . The Legislature has no power or authority
to require other qualifications than those, for
voting, provided in the Constitution ... The charter does not seek to deny the right to vote if the
name of the voter does not appear on the assessment roll, nor if he fails to produce a r~ceipt or
make an affidavit, or if the officer fails to write
'sworn' thereon."
An attempt to carry the doctrine of election officials' discretion to its logical extreme was rejected in
State v. Board of Canvassers, 68 S.E. 676 (So. Carolina

13

1910). The legislature had provided that persons seek-

ing to vote had to produce a registration certificate and
"proof of payment" of all taxes. The election officials
in some cases did not require both and in others neither.
An attempt was made to show compliance with the law
by proving that the managers knew the voters personally, and were satisfied that they had registration certif·
icates; and that they had paid their taxes. Although the
court did not deem it necessary to decide "just what
proof of payment of taxes, other than the certificate or
receipt ... which is made conclusive proof thereof, will
satisfy the statute," it did hold that at least the legis·
lature meant by the word "proof":
" ... legal and competent evidence, furnished
by affidavit or in some other legal form, and such
as would satisfy a reasonable mind of the truth."
To be contrasted with this last case is Henry v.
Oklahoma City, 108 P.2d 148 (Okla. 1940). The Okla·
homa legislature enacted a statute which defined the
state constitutional language "a qualified property tax
paying voter," to be "any qualified elector ... who has
actually paid taxes on property . . . , and who has a
legal tax receipt therefor dated within twelve months
prior to such election." In some cases election officials
permitted persons to vote upon affidavit of their quali·
fications rather than requiring the evidence of a legol
tax receipt. The court upheld this procedure saying:
"The Legislature may enact legislation to aid
the election officials to decide who is a 'qualified
taxpaying Yoter,' but in the final analysis, it 1'

14

the eJection officials who must decide what proof
convmces them of the fact, and their decision
should be exercised reasonably so as not to disfranchise a voter."
Point 3
THE PROCEDURE PROVIDED BY SECTION 11-14-6, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
1953, TO PERMIT A "CHALLENGED" VOTER
TO VOTE IF HE IS ON THE REGISTRATION LIST AND "SIGNS" AN OATH S'V"ORN
TO BEFORE ONE OF THE ELECTION OFFICIALS THAT HE IS A QUALIFIED ELECTOR IS CONSTITUTIONAL.
In enacting Section 11-14-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, the legislature recognized the many practical problems with which municipalities, school districts, counties, and other districts in Utah were confronted when seeking to establish voter qualification
by means of matching registration lists with the taxation rolls of the county. In some instances involving
special districts such as occurred in the Hamilton case
(Eldred R. Hamilton et al v. Salt Lake County SewerarJe Improvement District No. 1, 15 Utah 2d 216, 390
P.2d 235, 1964), the county officials in charge of the
tax or assessment rolls were unable to segregate the
persons residing within the special district involved.
In some instances even though the most recent tax or
assessment rolls were supplied to officials in charge
of the rolls, the names of the persons appearmg as
15

the taxpayers on the rolls differed from the manner
in which the name appeared on the registration rolls,
e.g., initials preceding the last name of the taxpayer
and the name and one initial used for the same taxpayer
on the registration rolls. In instances where tax receipts
were attempted to be used, this same problem would
become apparent, i.e., variations in the names and initials used by the same person to list himself as a tax·
payer on the rolls as compared to the manner in which I
he listed himself in the registration rolls.
·
f

Similarly, a wife could be deprived of her right
to vote even though her name appeared on the tax rolls
as well as the registration rolls because the name of
her husband did not properly appear on the tax rolls
so as to coincide with the manner in which his name
appeared on the registration rolls. (See Stipulation Testimony of J. Lambert Gibson, Record p. 17.)
As a practical matter also, in the large communities
and counties sheer numbers of population made cross·
checking between tax rolls and registration lists virtu·
ally impossible during the day of the election.
A statutory provision such as that of Section 11·
14-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which permits per·
sons to vote upon an affidavit of their qualification is
the only practicable means whereby constitutional right
to vote of a large segment of our populace can be pre·
served and implemented.
The use of the affidavits of qualification is not new
in Utah. It has been the practice for many years for
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the practical reasons above referred to. The statute
merely recognizes and formalizes what has been necessarily followed throughout the state.
In numerous jurisdictions the courts of last resort
haYe considered the question of whether the reliance of
election judges on affidavits is sufficient and have upheld this practice despite the fact that there was no
express legislative permission.
In Henry v. Oklahoma City, 108 P.2d 148 (Oklahoma 1940), a constitutional provision limiting the franchise in bond elections to "qualified property tax paying
voters" was further defined by statute to mean qualified
electors paying taxes and having legal tax receipts
therefor dated within 12 months prior to election. On
the facts of the case it appeared that persons were
allowed to vote in a city bond election who did not
possess such tax receipts but who furnished affidavits
that they were qualified taxpaying voters in the county
in which the city was located. The court conceded that
such affidavits were defective because not limited to the
city in question, but held that plaintiff had not overcome
the presumption of legality attaching to the votes once
they had been cast and counted. The opinion of the
court contains the following language at pages 152 to
155:

"'Ve are of the opinion that until the Legislature may otherwise provide, the election officials are justified in accepting from prospective
electors affidavits of their eligibility to vote ....
YVe cannot presume that the election officials

17

relied upon the [defective] affidavits as the only
means of establishing eligibility to vote. Tl;e
presumption is they properly performed their
duties.
" . . . We again quote from the opinion of
Logan v. Young, supra, as follows:
"There is also a well-established rule of law
that public officials are presumed to do their i
'
du t y ... "
In Morgan v. Board of Suvervisors, 192 P.2d 236
(Ariz. 1948), in which the facts were closely similar to
those appertaining in the Henry case except for the
question of infirmities in the affidavits used, the court
held at page 241:
" ... We believe that the action of the board
requiring each person, before voting, to certify
that he was a real property taxpayer, or to pre· I
sent a current tax receipt, was not an unreason· ,
able requirement but rather conformed with the
spirit of the general election laws relative to the
registration of voters."
Clearly, if the election officials provide an affidavit
procedure to determine whether a person is a "qualified
taxpaying voter" without legislative permission, the
legislature can provide for such a procedure and numer·
ous cases have so held :

State v. County of Dade, 125 So. 2d 833 (Fla.
1960)
State v. Old, 34 S.W. 690, 693 (Tenn. 1896)
Fitzmaurice v. Willis, 127 N.W. 95, 98 (N.D.
1910)
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The affidavit procedure for ascertaining whether
a particular voter possesses the required qualifications
is carefully discussed in the often-cited case Appeal of
Cusick, 20 A. 574, 576-77 (Pa. 1890). The court noted
that an affidavit is:
" ... intended to prevent fraud, and to this end
it probes the conscience of the voter by requiring
him to state such specific facts as to enable the
truth of his affidavit to be tested, and the proper
punishment imposed upon him if it is false ....
Without such particularity, the affidavit is not
of any use for any purpose."
The court held that although the Statute creating
the affidavit procedure by which qualification of unregistered voters was to be determined provided for an
adequate affidavit and did not alter constitutional requirements but rather safeguarded them and the integrity of the ballot; the affidavit in question did not comply with the statute and was too loose and vague to
protect the purity of the ballot.
See also State ex rel. O'Neill v. Trask, II5
N.,iV. 823 (Wis. 1908)
Although the affidavit procedure is a competent
method for determining voter qualification when such
affidavits are sufficiently specific to provide a basis for
prosecution for perjury, in an election contest the Arizona Supreme Court has asserted that the law is well
settled that statements in affidavits of registration as
to the registrant's place of residence are not conclusive
of the fact, although strong evidence is customarily
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needed to disprove the statements. Kauzlarich v. Board,
278 P.2d 888, 891 (Ariz. 1955).
Similarly the California Supreme Court has observed iu
dictum that a statute providing an oath:
" ... prescribes a smmnary mode of determining
whether the vote shall be received, and does not
determine its legality for any other purpose, else
one who had ·willfully, and for a fraudulent purpose, sworn falsely, would thereby become in
effect a legal voter, and no contest against one
elected by such votes could possibly succeed.
There is no provision of the statute giving the
oath any other effect than that of determining
the duty of the board to receive the vote." Falltrick v. Sullivan, 51 P. 947, 949 (Cal. 1898)
Thus, it is clear that the affidavit procedure provided for in the Utah l\Iunicipal Bond Act, (Utah Code
Annot ated, 1953) 11-14-6 is constitutional. It does
not add to or alter the constitutional requirements.
l\Ioreover, the procedure is an adequate means of
insuring and safeguarding the limitation that only electors qualified to vote exercise that right because it requires sufficient specificity to provide for prosecution
for perjury.
In the Hamilton case, supra, the court was presented with a situation where, under the resolution of
the entity calling the election, there was a requirement
that the election officials be supplied with a certified list
of the names of the registered voters residing in the
district. EYen though no statute required such a list
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to be made available, where the plaintiffs contesting
the election were able to demonstrate that persons whose
names did not appear on the tax rolls voted, it was held
by the court that even though such persons signed a
voter's oath, there was no substantial compliance with
the provisions of the statutes under which the election
was to be called and voters' qualifications determined and
that no machinery had been set up by the authority
calling the election under which the election officials
could actually determine voters' qualifications. As has
been previously pointed out, after the decision in the
Hamilton case, supra, the legislature at its next regular
session adopted the Utah Municipal Bond Act, supra,
and provided, among other things, in Section 8 of the
act (Section 11-14-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953)
that registration lists, or copies thereof, listing all registered electors entitled to use each voting place must be
made available at each voting place established for the
bond election, and in Section 7 of the Act (Section 1114-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953) that prior to a bond
election the registration lists so made available may be
checked against the tax rolls and the names of the
electors who paid a property tax marked in some convenient manner on the registration lists. The legislature provided, however, that the failure so to mark
the registration lists is not a ground for invalidating
a bond election. The legislature further adopted the
rule set forth in the H mnilton case, supra, to the effect
that a registered voter whose name appears on the
official tax roll as having paid a tax on property within
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the boundaries of the entity calling the election is prima
facie considered to be a qualified elector for bond election purposes.
The Utah Municipal Bond Act, supra, further provides in Section 7 (Section 11-14-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,) that any person who offers to vote at a
bond election may be challenged by any one or more
of the election officials, or by any other person, at
the time a ballot is applied for and may be permitted
to vote if such person is listed on the registration list
as a registered voter in the entity calling the election
and if such person signs an oath, properly sworn to before one of the election officials, that he is a qualified
elector of the entity calling the election and has paid a
property tax in such entity in the year preceding the
election. Under Sections 7 and 10 of the Utah Municipal
Bond Act (Sections 11-14-6 and 11-14-9, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953), election judges are given specific
authority to administer such oaths, authority which
the court in the Harnilton case, supra, found wanting.
The act provides a method for the election officials to
record the challenges and, when the returns of the
election are forwarded to the authority calling the
election, the number of votes which were cast by challenged voters must be kept track of separately, although
such votes must be considered as valid and legally cast,
unless a court in a bond election contest shall find otherwise. The legislature requires that no bond election be
held invalid on the ground unqualified persons participated, unless the point is established by clear and
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convincing evidence in an election contest filed pursuant to Section 13 of the Utah Municipal Bond Act
(Section 11-14-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,) within forty days after the returns of the election are canvassed.
The City of Centerville in calling the election here
under attack provided simply that the registration lists
showing the registered voters in the city should be furnished to the election officials. The resolution (Record
p. 9) further provided that each person whose name
appeared on the registration list offering to vote would
be challenged, but would be permitted to vote upon
signing an oath sworn to before one of the election
officials certifying that he was a qualified elector of the
city and had paid the required property tax in the
year preceding the election. It was not contemplated
to furnish the election officials conducting the election
with copies of the official tax roll or any other material,
other than the registration lists and the oaths, in order
to enable the election officials to establish the taxpaying
qualifications of persons seeking to vote at the election.
The trial court held that the procedure which was contemplated to be used was constitutional and that the
provisions of the Utah Municipal Bond Act, supra,
dealing with this subject are constitutional.
As pointed out elsewhere in this brief, it is submitted that an election otherwise validly and legally
conducted is not void on the ground taxpaying qualifications were determined solely by resort to voter's oaths
in the manner permitted by the U tab Municipal Bond
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Act, supra. It is submitted that the legislature of the
State of Utah has by the enactment of the Utah .Municipal Bond Act, supra, given its approval to the use of
voter's oaths and has provided a method whereby entities calling bond elections may provide for the use of
voter's oaths. It is further submitted that the voter's
0ath contemplated by the Centerville resolution to be
used at the election is in conformance with all statutory
and constitutional requirements and is proper for use
in bond elections in the State of Utah.
If voter's oaths are used at a bond election the
legislature has created a presumption that the election
has been validly conducted and that unless an election
contest is brought challenging the determination of the
qualification of voters, or any other question concerning
the conduct of the election, within the time prescribed
by Section 13 of the Utah Municipal Bond Act, supra,
Section 11-14-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953), no
person may raise such questions in attacking the
validity of the election or the validity of the bond issue
authorized at the election. It is requested that as previously demonstrated this court should uphold as constitutional such procedure and the provisions of the
Utah lVlunicipal Bond Act, supra.
If this court should decide that a bond election
at which persons voted as contemplated by the City of
Centerville is improper and void, then it is respectfully
requested that the various entities in the State of Utah
seeking to hold bond elections be advised by the court
as to which method or methods of determining taxpaying

24

i

qualifications will satisfy the constitutional reqmrements. If resort to voter's oaths may not be had, the
alternatives might be: (I) to require that election officials at bond elections must be supplied with a copy
of the official tax roll of the county and must find the
name of any person offering to vote on that tax list
before permitting the voter to vote; ( 2) to require the
procedure set forth in the Utah Municipal Bond Act,
supra, permitting the tax rolls to be checked against the
registration lists to be followed at every bond election;
or (3) to require each prospective voter before being
permitted to vote to establish that he has paid a tax
in the required territory during the prescribed time by
the production of a proper tax receipt.
From the stipulation submitted to the trial court
in this cause (Record p. 16) it is apparent that, as a
practical matter, it is extremely difficult for entities
calling a bond election to provide election officials with
accurate and complete information as to who is or who
is not a taxpayer. It is highly impracticable to think
that the only way this problem can be solved is to require
the prospective voter to provide evidence of the payment
of a tax. This is simply not a workable arrangement, as
it would be very difficult to make certain that persons
seeking to vote would bring the correct material to the
polls and, as a matter of public policy, it is doubted that
the courts should put such restrictive limitations on the
right to vote at a bond election. It also appears that the
solution in each case will not be to require the entity
calling the election to supply the election officials with
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a definitive list of the taxpaying electors residing within
the precinct entitled to vote at the polling place, either
by supplying a copy of the tax list or comparing the
registration lists with the tax list and marking the
names of taxpayers on the registration lists. Comparing
the registration list with the tax list is a costly and
time-consuming task, especially in the metropolitan
areas. Furnishing the tax lists themselves of ten provides
complications simply because of the facts, as demonstrated in the stipulation, that ownership often appears
in a different form on the tax roll than the voters' names
appear on the registration lists. Also complicating the
problems are contract purchasers and spouses whid1
make possible delays and confusion at the polls in checking the names on the tax lists. The legislature by enacting the Utah Municipal Bond Act, supra, has provided a workable way to avoid the problem raised in the
Hamilton case, supra, where the boundaries of the entity
calling the election bisect or are different than the
boundaries of the election precincts, and it has attempted
to solve the problems of determining taxpaying qualifications at bond elections in a manner consistent with the
pertinent constitutional provisions as demonstrated in
this brief. It is submitted that in order to facilitate the
orderly conduct of bond elections in this state, this court
should hold that bond elections are not invalid merely
because voters' qualifications were determined through
reference to affidavits or oaths sworn to by persons
seeking to vote in the manner provided by Section 7
of the Utah Municipal Bond Act, supra, after a chal-

26

lenge as provided in that act, and that unless it is demonstrated in an election contest, brought within the time
permitted by the Utah Municipal Bond Act, supra,
that enough unqualified persons voted to have changed
the result of the election, no one may challenge the
validity of the bonds nor the validity of the election
after the statutory period for the election contest shall
have expired. This rule, if adopted by the court, will not
prevent entities from providing election officials with
lists of taxpayers as authorized by the Utah Municipal
llond Act, supra, but such election officials should be
permitted to accept affidavits or oaths from persons
seeking to vote and the same presumptions with respect
to such votes should be accorded to such elections after
the expiration of the election contest period.
Point 4
SECTION 11-14-5, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, MAY CONSTITUTIONALLY
PROVIDE THAT THE SPOUSE OF A PERSON PA YING TAX E S ON PROPERTY
SHALL BE DEEMED TO HAVE PAID A
PROPERTY TAX AND THEREFORE MAY
VOTE.
As has been indicated above, the legislature can
not constitutionally enlarge the provisions of Section
3 of Article XIV so as to give a power to vote to a person who does not constitute one who has paid a property
tax.
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The "spouse provision" in Section 6 of the Utah
Municipal Bond Act can be read two ways: If it is
so construed as to provide that the spouse of a qualified
taxpayer can vote, whether or not the spouse in his
own right meets the constitutional requirement of having "paid a property tax," it is clearly unconstitutional
The legislature cannot wholly disregard the constitutional requirements in determining as an administrative
matter who shall be permitted to vote.
On the other hand the constitutional phrase "shall
have paid a property tax" is not so unambiguous as to
be decisive in all situations. Although interpreting a
constitutional term in its application to specific facts is
a judicial and not a legislative function, any legislation
regulating the conduct of electors must make some
assumptions about the interpretation of constitutional
language. The present statute can be viewed as a declaration that the existence of the constitutional qualifications may be shown to exist by certain evidence. Thus,
the legislature has told the election judges that the fact
that a person presenting himself to vote is the spouse
of a person owning property in the municipality and
paying a tax therein is sufficient evidence that that
person himself meets the constitutional qualifications of
having "paid a tax on property."
The judicial construction placed on the constitutional requirement of taxpayer status seldom makes the
evidence of in whose name the property is assessed nor
evidence of who in fact has paid the tax nor even the
legal title, determinative.
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See Setterlun v. Keene, 87 P. 763 (Ore. 1906)
See Saller v. C.I.R., 122 F.2d 430, 432
( C.A.A. pa.)
See JVelfare Federation of Cleveland v. Glander, 64 N.E.2d 813, 823 (Ohio 1945)
See Johnson v. Young, 287 P. 688, 689 (Idaho,
1930)
Rather the courts seem to use one or a combination of
these factors to determine who will actually bear the
burden of an increased tax which is the issue to be voted
upon.
In Morgan v. Board of Sup'rs, 192 P.2d 236, 243
(Ariz. 1948), the court in holding that veterans and
widows who were exempted from taxes were properly
not permitted to vote on questions to be submitted to
vote of real property "taxpayers" stated:
"We do not believe it was the intention of the
framers of the Constitution to permit those who
did not bear the "burden of taxation" to be heard
on the question of whether a bonded indebtedness should be incurred."
Thus, in State v. Menengali, 270 S.W. 101 (Mo.
1925) the court held that a wife met the requirement
that school directors must be resident "taxpayers,"
although the personal property which she owned was
listed and assessed in her husban.d's name and the taxes
thereon had been paid by the husband.

A case quite similar in principle though not involving a husband and wife situation is City of Pocatello

29

v. Murray, 130 P. 383 (Idaho 1913) where the court
held that although property stood in the name of 011 ,
to whom it was assessed and who pai<l the taxes thereon, another who established that he was a joint owner
and had paid the tax on his half interest was held to be
a "taxpayer." See also: Ralls v. Sharp's Admr, 131

s.,v.

!

')

998, 1000.

J ft/-;: 2 c3 /)!u~' )1u ,i
In Baca v. Village of Belen/)the Supreme Court of
New .Mexico held that wife whose husband paid the tax
assessed on community property met the constitutional
requirement that persons voting on question of creating
debt be "such qualified electors . . . as have paid a
property tax therein during the preceding year." The f
court went into a lengthy discussion of the payment
of taxes by an agent and treated husband and wife in
a community property state as each other's agents and \
therefore both were entitled to vote. The court also noted
that it was "immaterial whether such community prop- \
erty stands assessed on the tax records in the name of
the husband or wife, or both.... " But where none of
these three factors was present the husbands of women
who owned property in the district on which they (the
women) were assessed and paid the tax were not "tax·
payers" within the meaning of the Kentucky statutes,
(Tate v. Board of Trustees, 49 S.,V. 337 (Ky. 1899).

I

I

In Henry v. Oklahoma City, 108 P.2d 148 (O~la.
1940) an action was brought to have a bond electwn
declared illegal on the ground that a sufficient number
of votes to change the result of the election were ca~!
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1

by persons not legally qualified to vote in the election.
The Oklahoma Constitution provided that only "qualified property tax paying voters" should be entitled to
vote on bond issues. The Oklahoma legislature had
enacted a statute which expressly defined a "qualified
tax paying voter" to be "any qualified elector under the
Coustitution and laws of the State of Oklahoma, who
has actually paid taxes on property within such city
or town, and who has a legal tax receipt therefor dated
within twelve months prior to such election." (Thus,
the legislature was in effect declaring that a "tax receipt"
would be sufficient evidence of qualification.)

From the record it appeared that several classes
of voters did not actually possess a tax receipt and exhibit it to the election officials as a prerequisite to vote.
The court described these classes of voters:
"In some cases one of the spouses held joint
property in his or her name; in other cases, although the property was held jointly, one had
paid the taxes with joint funds, but held the tax
receipt in one name; in other cases the voters had
paid taxes on their property through some agency
that held the receipts ....
"In all of these cases the trial judge ruled that
such voters were fully qualified to vote within
the meaning of the statute, and we think rightfully so. Those voters had receipts within the
meaning of the statute ... " (Emphasis added.)
The case can be read as holding that where one
spouse holds joint property in his name or one has paid
taxes on property jointly held with joint funds, both are
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within the constitutional term "property tax paymg
voters."
See also Henley v. Elmore County, 242 P.2d 85j,
857 (Idaho, 1952), where a complaint seeking a declatory judgment that the proposition submitted at a
special bond election had been defeated was challenged
on appeal on the ground that the term "taxpayers"
as used in the amended complaint, as persons qualified
to vote, did not include or specify the wife or husband
of a taxpayer, which wife or husband would be entitled
to vote under the Idaho Statutes. The court held that
the word "taxpayer" as used in the complaint included
a husband or wife of a taxpayer and therefore the com·
plaint was sufficient.
Appellant submits that the decision of the district
court finding this portion of Section 11-14-5, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, is unconstitutional and beyond the
power of the legislature is in error.
Point 5
SECTION 11-14-5, UTAH CODE ANNO·
TATED, 1953, :MAY CONSTITUTIONALLY
PROVIDE THAT A CONTRACT PURCHAS·
ER SHALL BE DEEMED TO BE A PERSON
'VHO HAS PAID A PROPERTY TAX AND
THEREFORE MAY VOTE.
The legislature, in providing for a recognition of
the contract purchaser as a person who is paying a prop·
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erty tax, recognizes that basically the purpose of Section
3 of Article XIV of the Constitution is to give the power
to create the bond obligation to the person who will
be paying the tax required to repay the obligation. It
recognizes, too, that in our modern day economy a substantial number of householders and businesses are acquiring their property by means of sales contracts
wherein they develop substantial equity in the property
before title is conveyed. It is generally the rule that
when the property is being sold pursuant to a conditional sales contract, the purchaser is required to pay the
taxes.
Accordingly, the voting power of a substantial
number of electors is involved.
The following cases have dealt with the problem
and have come to the following conclusions:
In Junker v. Glendale Union High School District,
236 P.2d 1010, lOll (Ariz. 1951), the court upheld
the right of the contract purchaser to vote even though
title to the property was retained by the seller. The
court stated:
"The issue is not without difficulty, and having made a thorough search of the authorities
cited by both sides as well as an independent
search we fail to find a case directly in point ....
. . . In the instant case the purchasers under
the contracts are the ones who as a matter of fact
are subject to the taxes and really paying them.
It is true that bare legal title is still in the
vendors, which they hold merely as a security
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device, and in trust for the vendees. The vendees
of a specifically enforceable contract are the equi ·
table owners and as such have been held to be the
real owners . ...

" ... The vendee is the only person eligible u11- I
der the constitutional provision and should bear- ·
corded this privilege [to vote} whether the prop- '
erty is assessed to him or not, as he is primarily
affected by the results. He is the one who mn;t
pay the additional taxes and bear the burden of
the lien thus created."

In Fugate v. Mayor and City Council of Buffalo,
348 P.2d 76 (\Vyo. 1960), the applicable statute pro·
vided that the person who votes must be the owner of
property which is assessed on the assessment rolls. The
court did not consider the question at length, but the
following aspects of its opinion are pertinent, at pages
78, 79 and 82:
" ... After a pretrial conference had been held.
the parties herein entered into a stipulation of
facts, which in substance is as follows:
" . . . Three persons were the vendees under
a recorded contract for a warranty deed and the
property covered by such contract was assessed
in the names of the vendors and the vendees ... ·
" ... So we think that the persons who were
actually owners of property at the time of th~
election according to the agreed statement of
facts should be considered to be legal voters."
See also the opinion of the Supreme Court of J\fichi·
gan in Goldsmith v. Albion Public Schools, 129 N.W.
2d 377 (Mich. 1964) on this general question.
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Although it is said that the right to purchase real
estate under a contract does not constitute one the owner
thereof ( 18 Am. J ur., Elections, § 71, 226; 95
ALR 1099; People v. Milan, 5 P.2d 239,) State v.
City of Rochester, 109 N.W. 2d 44 (Minn. 1961), is a
well-reasoned opinion to the contrary. There the question
was the right to petition for the annexation of land. The
court's reasoning is the same as that expressed in Junker
v. Glendale Union High School District, supra, and
Morgan v. Board of Sup'rs, supra:
Looking at the result of an annexation, it
seems apparent to us that it is the vendee and not
the vendor who will be affected by it....

Point 6
IT IS CONSTITUTIONAL FOR THE
LEGISLATURE TO PROVIDE THAT AN
ELECTOR CAN VOTE IF HE HAS PAID
A PROPERTY
TAX
DURING
THE
TWELVE MONTHS PRECEDING THE
ELECTION ~THEN THE CONSTITUTION
PROVIDES "IN THE YEAR PRECEDING
THE ELECTION."
Appellant has heretofore in this brief called the
attention of the court to the fact that the legislature has
a responsibility to help the election officers implement
the constitutional provision. It has also urged that a
constitution is to be liberally construed in order to in-
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sure that the constitutional rights or privileges are enjoyed by the citizens of the community entitled thereto.

1

Section 3 of Article XIV of the Utah Consti1
tution extends the franchise to such qualified elector;
1
as "shall have paid a property tax therein in the year .
preceding such election." The term "year" is not an '
absolute term. It can readily mean a "calendar year,"!
or it can mean just as readily a period of 12 calendar .
months. The Constitution seeks to give the franchise i
to vote upon the matter of incurring indebtedness
to those who will be faced with the taxes necessary
to make repayment. The legislature, in giving con- .
sideration to a proper interpretation of the Consti- i
tutional intent must have given consideration to the I
fact that those who last made payment of taxes in all
probability will be those who will be on hand to pay the
taxes incurred in the future to pay the indebtedness.
Certainly an individual who has divested himself of
the property during a current calendar year was not
the individual that either the constitutional convention
or the legislature believed should exercise the franchise
for purposes of determining the future tax obligations
imposed upon the property.
1

'Vhich is the broader interpretation? The term
"preceding year" means the preceding "calendar year"
or it means the "preceding twelve month period." A
few examples will readily illustrate that "the preceding
calendar year" will divest current payers of taxes of a
right to participate in the bond vote.
36
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Suppose a bond election occurs in December of
1965, and let us su:r;>pose that an owner of real property
newly acquired it in the fall of 1965 with the result that
.
he actually paid taxes in November, 1965. If we follow
the interpretation that "the year preceding such election"
as used in the Constitution means the "calendar year
preceding such election," then the taxpayer in our
example would not be qualified to participate in the
vote, yet common sense tells us that in all likelihood he
will be the landowner and taxpayer who will be confronted with the taxes necessary to repay the bonds
in the succeeding years and in all likelihood would be
the one having the greatest concern in the outcome of
the bond election. On the other hand, such an interpretation would give the franchise solely to the person who
sold the property in the fall of 1965 and, who, thereafter,
paid no tax upon it and has no active interest therein.
The interpretation that the legislature gave to the
term "year" is more liberal when it provides that it
means the "twelve months preceding the election."

As a second example, let us suppose that a bond
, election is held in February of 1965. Either interpretation of the term "year preceding the election" would
give the franchise to a payer of taxes upon real property
who paid during the month of November of 1964, but
if that taxpayer was late in making payment and didn't
pay it until January 10, 1965, and happened to acquire
the property sometime during 1964, he would be disqualified from participating in the election unless the
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preceding year was interpreted to refer to the preceri r
ing twelve-month period .
.Moreover, were we referring to a payer of taxe
upon personal property, a February election woulr~
occur prior to the time during which many of our aulrr
mobile taxpayers pay their taxes and even prior to tlir.
time when many of our business enterprises pay their
inventory taxes. In such case the term 'if interpreteJ
as meaning preceding "calendar year," would excludei
current personal property taxpayer who paid subst·
quent to January 1, of 1965.
The use of the term "preceding year" as meaning
the preceding calendar year would create more inequi
ties than the use of the meaning "twelve preceding
months" and would defeat the prime purpose of the
constitutional provision to submit the matter of voting
upon the proposition of creating a debt to taxpayen
who will have a direct concern in the repayment of tht
indebtedness.

CONCLUSION
The provisions of Sections 11-14-5 and 11-IH
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as adopted in the Utali
Municipal Bond Act, properly implement the prori·
sions of Section 3 of Article XIV of the Constitution
of the State of Utah. They are not unconstitutional
extensions of the voting power to nonqualified indi·
viduals, but represent a necessary and proper exer·
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eise by the legislature of the State of Utah of its obligation to assist election officers to implement and understand the constitutional provisions as to voter qualificaxe·
tion.
'eri

ulr~

Appellant submits that the judgment of the district
tlir. eourt finding that that portion of Section 11-14-5, Utah
1e11
Code Annotated, 1953 (Section 6, Chapter 41, Laws of
teJ Utah, 1965), which extends the definition of a taxpayer
ei
to include the spouse of one paying taxes is unconstiturst· tional and beyond the power of the legislature is in
error and that accordingly the judgment of the district
court making the restraining order prohibiting the connu
c duct of the bond election permanent should be reversed.
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Respectfully submitted,
A.M.FERRO
Attorney for Appellant
414 Walker Bank Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
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